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POINTS OF AGREEMENT AMONG SOCIOLOGISTS 
PROFESSOR ALBION W. SMALL 
University of Chicago 
When the secretary asked me to read a paper at this meeting, 
my answer was that I would start an informal discussion, but 
that the one thing needful to make such conventions as this a 
success was the banishment of "papers" altogether. Then, like 
thousands before me, I followed the line of least resistance, and 
before I had stopped jottil1Jg down the points which I should 
like to expand, I had scheduled twenty propositions, with some-
what extended comments. They amount to a rather cogent piece 
of evidence that my creed was better than my practice. 
If I had anticipated what occurred last evening, I should ave 
added another ingredient to my prescription for a successful 
meeting-viz., the abolition of presidents who put into their 
inaugural addresses all that can be said by the subsequent speak-
ers. Professor Ward last evening covered the ground so com-
pletely that what I have to offer is already out of date. The 
only criticism I could pass on his address, if I wanted to pick a 
quarrel with him, is the exact opposite of the most obvious fault 
with the remarks I shall make. I thought he claimed a little too 
much for sociology up to date, while I shall claim much less than 
the facts bear out. I shall not attempt to sum up all the points 
on which sociologists agree. I shall not venture at all into state-
ments of social principles. The twenty propositions which 
I shall recite, with such comments as time permits, might indeed 
be compressed into the apparently trite observation that the 
sociologists are fairly well agreed about their point of view. 
Anyone who has looked below the surface of the history of science 
knows that when a: group of scientists have gone so far they 
have potentially solved their major problems. Whatever else 
sociology is, we all see that it is important first of all simply as 
a point of view. We have taken possession of our standing-
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ground, and we shall now proceed at our leisure to move the 
world. 
I. My first proposition is that for the purpose of this dis-
cussion we may confine ourselves to consideration of scope and 
method. 
Nobody is more thoroughly aware than I that for the spirit's 
daily food mighty little sunshine can be abstracted directly from 
the methodological cucumber. Methodology is merely .the alge-
bra of knowledge. On the other hand, knowledge cannot grow 
from scrap perceptions to coherent generalizations without valid 
mental method. As knowledge advances from the accretions of 
casual experience to the accumulations of planned research, 
incessant criticism of method is indispensable. When we are at 
the stage of deliberate investigation, the methodologist must run 
the lines of preliminary survey, and he must account for the 
inaccuracies and the discrepancies in first results. Progress in 
science depends on development of method not less than on multi-
plication of data. No one whose judgment has weight can 
lightly esteem any evident tendency among investigators toward 
. Lonsensus about delimitation of problems and competence of 
methods. The methodologist is not the sociologist par excellence, 
but the sociologists are far enough advanced to have recognized 
the necessity of constant vigilance in criticizing their own 
methodology. 
2. In the second place, ((agreement," in this discussion, is o 
relative term. 
Fortunately we are not so contentedly agreed about anything 
that there is likely to be an arrest of progress among us in the 
near future from lack of sparks to keep our motors moving. 
What I refer to as "agreement" in a given case might perhaps 
be more accurately phrased as "inclination to emphasize," as 
contrasted with utter absence of settled usage one or two decades 
ago. If any of us, for example, employ biological metaphors 
for sociological relations, we all understand that they are meta-
phors, even if we have no precise common denominator for 
expressing the facts literally. Again. if we differ widely in our 
terminology, it is increasingly evident that these variations stand 
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for convergent efforts to formulate one and the same thing. 
The margin ·of difference between us represents in part our 
search for slightly different types of relations when we appear to 
be after the same things; in part our failure quite to make out 
the exact relations that we are running down; and in part mere 
conflicts of judgment about the systems of notation to be used 
in recording what has been ascertained. 
3· We agree to discriminate' between the axis of sociology 
and the center of interest chosen by any individual sociologist. 
A dozen years ago the dispassionate observer would have had 
the general appearance of things rather uniformly on his side if 
he had said that each sociologist thinks the head of the table is 
where he sits, and that unadulterated sociological food is served 
only from his porringer. At peril of further snarling this tangle 
of tropes, I may say that the sociologists are today employed in 
many divisions of labor, but we are rapidly outgrowing the foible 
of considering our division either the sole measure of sociol~gical 
value or the Greenwich meridian for all the rest. Our concep-
tion of the scope of sociological problems excludes the pre-
sumption that a single investigator, or a single group or type of 
investigators, can control all the conditions that enter into the 
problems. Our work will be abortive unless in spirit and in 
eff·ect it is co-operative. Each of us is not only better able than 
a few years ago to see that his own contribution to the final 
result can be but a fragment at best, but each of us feels an 
intelligent respect for the importance of his neighbor's work. 
Sociology is no longer to our minds merely, or even principally, 
the particular phase of theory or practice which chiefly engages 
our individual attention. It is the correlated system of positive 
inquiry into human relations in which every variation of approach 
to real knowledge of social experience will ultimately find its 
place. 
4· We agree to differentiate sociology from antecedent 
psychology or cosmology or metaphysics. 
For purely conceptual purposes sociology is one thing-
viz. , the inclusive and co-ordinated system of knowledge referred 
to in the last sentence of 3 ; for practical working purposes it is 
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an assemblage of very different things. In the former aspect 
sociology is a much-to-be-desired organon of all the discoveries 
and all the indications about social relations which are pre-
sumably within the reach of all the actual and hereafter-to-be-
differentiated sciences that relate to society. It is "the far-off 
divine event" at the .terminus of the human pursuit of self-
knowledge. With this primarily schematic organization of 
knowledge, into which the positive social sciences are slowly 
putting a content, the more general questions of methodology 
must be concerned. We need not here discuss any of them in 
detail. 
Sociology as an actual investigation of concrete relations 
in society, on the other hand, is some sort of dealing with the 
phenomena of cause and effect in associations of two or more 
human persons. Now all the phenomena of association between 
persons are conditioned both by the qualities of the individuals 
associating, and by the underlying mundane and cosmic order 
which sets the stage for the human drama. It is almost axio-
matic, therefore, that reflection upon the most familiar forms of 
societary relationships may at any moment press men of philo-
sophic bent back toward antecedent problems of psychology, or 
cosmology, or metaphysics. It has not seldom happened that 
men have proposed sociological problems, or have started from 
some sociological preconception, but have ended by doing the 
bulk of their work upon problems which were not directly 
sociological in the second or narrower sense. They were pre-
or sub- or super- or supra- or circum-sociological. Yet they 
have not unlikely urged their claim to be rated as pre-eminently 
sociological. In the former of the two senses they may have 
been. At a given moment a contribution to psychology, or to 
physical science, or to metaphysics may do more toward con-
structing the ultimate system of knowledge about society than 
any contemporary contribution by investigators of strictly social 
relations. The person who makes the former contribution, how-
ever, is no more a sociologist in the second sense than the stone-
mason who lays the foundation of a hous·e is the wood-worker 
who helps to finish it. We are getting away from the supposed 
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necessity of appropriating to our particular occupation every title 
that carries credit. We realize that questions of rank and dignity 
are not at issue. We are distinguishing between types of work 
upon types or phases or sections of problems, and we are more 
willing to call them by their appropriate names. The more socio-
logical we are in spirit, the more scrupulous we are to be sure, 
and to make others sure, that in practice we are aware when our 
operations are primarily within one division of research or 
another. We are thus becoming more amenable to the specific 
logical and methodological descipline requisite for the validity 
of our processes in our actual scope of investigation. This means 
much in the way of graduation out of amateurishness, not to 
say quackery, and advance toward responsible scientific pro-
cedure. 
5· We agree that the primary task of sociology is to discover 
and to formulate the lfmJs of those processes in h~man associa-
tion which differ, eitherr in degree or in kind, from processe'S' 
that occur in antecedent orders in the scale of evolution. 
So long as the Aristotelian static interpretation of the uni-
verse was the major premise in human thinking, we did not 
question that we were on the track of reality when, in trying to 
classify knowledge, we added another to the always futile attempts 
to mark off the boundaries of the sciences geometrically, like the 
squares of a ches~board. The majority of the small fraction of 
the human race who think at all are still fondly sure that one 
segment of the sphere of know ledge is the preordained preserve 
of geology, another of biology, another of history, and so on. 
The few people who are beginning to make out the meaning of 
the perception that all reality is the interplay of all the forces 
which multiply causes and effects in the universe, are rapidly 
discovering the foolishness of the time-honored attempts at 
schematic classifications of the sciences. We see that those 
attempts were like children's building of alphabet blocks into 
houses. The blocks are not real building materials, and the 
houses are not real houses. Except in so far as we are referring 
to mere collections of material, data, evidence, demarkation of 
sciences is not a problem of areas of substances, but of relations 
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of forces. The problems of every science are problems of the 
action of all the forces that are organized into the phenomena 
which present the problems. A given problem encountered by 
the chemist, for example, may prove to be equally a problem for 
the physicist, and the geologist, and the astronomer. That is, 
it is a question of what forces are at work, in what proportions 
each is employed, and in what manner they join in resultant 
action. So of the psychical sciences. 
Accordingly, we have a perfectly intelligible index of the 
distinction between sociological and ante-sociological problems, 
not in a monopoly of a certain superficial area of material, but 
in reserve of distinctive types of problems . . The questions for 
investigation which we group for convenience under such titles, 
for example, as physics, and chemistry, and physiology, and 
psychology, are not separated from the unanswered questions of 
sociology by the fact that the forces and the reactions considered 
by the former are absent from the situations studied by the latter. 
The difference is that each of the ante-sociological sciences 
attempts to generalize the actions of particular types of forces, 
each in its turn making whatever allowance is necessary for 
the conditioning action of the other types of forces. In the same 
way sociology, using the term now in the second of the two 
senses explained in 4, attempts to generalize the action of forces 
peculiar to human. association, all the while carefully calculating 
the allowance which has to be made for the specific action of 
forces which it is the task of ante-sociological sciences to investi-
gate. 
For example, the problems of heredity belong primarily to 
biology, not to sociology. Before the biologist learns all about 
heredity, however, he will have checked up all the types of phe-
nomena in the life-history of the different orders, from the 
humblest infusoria to Europe's proudest royal families. The 
biologist does not thereby become a sociologist, because his 
search is not for social phenomena as such. but for phenomena 
of heredity, in whatever orders of life they appear. On the 
other hand, the sociologist may be studying, for instance, the 
tendencies in the birth-rate of a selected civilized nation. A 
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primary problem is the extent to which the phenomena are 
physiological on the one hand, and psychical or moral on the 
other. The hereditary factors involved are elements in the 
sociological calculation just so far as they affect the birth-rate. 
Possibly it becomes necessary for the sociologist to undertake 
a study of the physical relation of the ancestors of the given 
population to the fecundity of the present generation. That 
would, of course, be a special problem in heredity. If scientific 
investigation went on according to a strictly logical plan, the 
sociologist would start upon such a problem only under con-
ditions like those which would send the artillery corps of an 
army scurrying over the country after forage-viz.. when the 
commissary department had failed to do its part. When the soci-
ologist studies the relation of sexual abnormality in ancestors to 
the fertility of offspring, it is not because the problems of 
heredity fall within his proper scope, nor because he is interested 
in problems of heredity as such. It is because he is interested in 
heredity in so far as it conditions social relations, or at most in 
variations which are peculiar to human societies. 
We may add an illustration showing the same distinction 
between problems of psychology and sociology. I will not try 
to tell just where psychological problems end and where ~io­
logical problems begin, because the chances are that I should 
fail. In the rough, however, psychology attempts to generalize 
the phenomena of consciousness--i. e., stimulation, attention, the 
formation of images, valuation, volition, etc. The primary prob-
lems of psychology refer to the relations of stimuli and modes 
of consciousness to each other, abstracted from aill further sig-
nificance of the external stimuli which may start the conscious-
ness process, or of the subsequent effects of consciousness pro-
cesses. Returning to the problem of the birth-rate, for example, 
the sociologist encounters phenomena of consciousness in the facts 
of human propagation, and perhaps he demonstrates that in a 
given case tnese are relatively more decisive of the birth-rate 
than hereditary factors. His concern with these consciousness 
factors, however, is not as variations of the phenomena of con-
sciousness, but as factors of social influence. He maJy have to 
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analyze them beyond the point at which the psychologists have 
left them, or he may not. In the former case it is another 
analogy with the foraging expedition. It is merely incidental to 
the proper pursuit of the sociological interest-viz., the specific 
reactions in consciousness which are due to the presence and 
activity of our fellows. When he is clearly in his own specialty, 
instead of making requisitions upon researches that bear the 
psychologists' brand, the sociologist is after exact knowledge of 
combinations of which activities of consciousness are factors, 
but he deals with them distinctively in the forms in which they 
appear in the composite units, human persons. He inquires into 
the activities of persons in the direction of reciprocal influence 
upon each other, rather than in the direction of analysis of the 
subjective process through which those objective combinations 
are mediated. For instance, he asks how individuals influence 
and are influenced by customs, traditions, social standards, 
authorities, conventions, rivalries, alliances, etc. As a sociologist, 
he takes for grant·ed the cycles of activity in consciousness 
through which these influences are exerted. 
6. If 5 does not seem to correspond with the activities of some 
sociologists, it is because we do not find the laws of antecedent 
phenomena worked out minutely enough to be taken over bodily 
into sociology from other sciences, and we plunge into prelimir 
nary work, instead of dealing with sociology proper. 
This proposition is merely a restatement of the situation illus-
trated in 5 by excursions of sociologists into biology and psy-
chology. Relatively little has been done from the sociological 
point of view upon the specifically societary action of forces which 
emerge much lower down in the evolutionary order. The hiatus 
in part accounts for the amount of work labeled sociology which 
has been attempted by sociologists merely because they see that 
it is essential to sociological investigation, but that it has been 
overlooked by the people whose proper work includes the class 
of problems to which it belongs. 
7· We ma~ acknowledge disagreement upon a fundamental 
conception and corresponding methods; viz., starting with some 
variation of the formula, {(Sociology is the science of society.," 
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we differ on the question whether society has been produced 
chiefly by the same forces that ha:ve produced the flora and fauna 
of the earth, or chiefly by forces by virtue of which society is 
something essentially different from flora and fauna. 
Accordingly we tend to make our "science of society," on 
the one hand, a more generalized botany and zoology, or, on the 
Dither hand, a mere generalized psychology. We might express 
the one extreme by pressing into use a word in its technical 
economic sense, and saying that society is wholly a product of 
"land." We might represent the other extreme by asserting 
that society is wholly the product of mind. As I shall show more 
fully in a moment, this divergence is not properly a schism in 
our sociology, but rather a reflection of our inherited prejudices 
in cosmic philosophy and in methodology. 
8. We are agreed that it is hypercritical to raise questions 
of metaphysical dualism or monism in connection 1.uith the differ-
ence in 7· 
The prejudices which we inherit or imitate may once have 
had actually dualistic or monistic connotations in a sense which 
sociologists today feel themselves at perfect liberty to waive. 
Our concern is with forces which our present state of knowl-
edge most conveniently groups as "physical" and "psychical." 
We are not bound to venture any ontological assumptions about 
the ultimate nature of those forces. So far as they demonstrate 
themselves in social reactions, they are qualitatively unlike 
enough to be treated as quite irreducible factors. In frankly 
accepting them accordin1gly, and in analyzing their operations 
so far as they appear above the line of our horizon, we are 
acting strictly in accordance with the proprieties of our division 
of labor. It is not our business to push analysis back into 
metaphysics. 
9· Even the difference in 7 is converging toward agreement. 
Recognizing both physical and mental factors in every stage 
of the evolution of human association, our sociological methods 
are tending toward fixity in one of three ground forms; viz., 
first, an attempt to reduce the phenomena of human association 
to terms of physical factors; second, abstraction of those types 
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of association in which the determining factors are psychic, and 
concentration of attention upon the contents and variations of 
associations as purely psychic situations; third, a calculus of the 
ratio of the physical and the psychical in the various types of 
association. 
It requires no gift of second sight to foresee that these three 
methods must eventually become one. I take slight risks of wan-
dering far beyond the confines of our agreements when I speak 
for a moment of their near future. 
10. Our mental limitations being what they are, frank recog-
nition of these three tendencies, and open avowal of allegiance 
to one or other of them, is more and more probable and desirable. 
Very few men are likely to be equally capable of the highest 
efficiency in physical and psychical research. Most of us must 
choose between being experts in one and laymen in the other, or 
without our choice we shall rate as dabblers in both. Some 
men may be able to do very little first-hand investigation either 
of physical or of psychical elements, yet they may do good work 
in verifying estimates of the proportions of those elements in 
typical situations. Provided men of these types are working 
within hailing distance of one another, and are keeping tab on 
one another's performances, it is in the interest of the ec;nomy of 
effort that each type shall work upon its specific clue to the 
limit. Let the men who believe that language, and art, and 
science, and politics, and love, and religion, are merely the 
finished products of the same forces which have reached an 
equilibrium in the forms of matter that are apparent to our 
senses-let them work away upon their hypothesis, until all the 
evidence within reach is brought to the support of their theorem. 
Let the men who believe that mind rather than matter determines 
the phenomena peculiar to human society-let them also summon 
the evidence and display it for all it is worth. Let the men 
who are attorneys neither for physics nor for psychics continue 
to hold the balance between the opposing claims, and to find a 
place in the reckoning for each new factor, or power of a factor, 
which either of the other types has overlooked or underrated. 
Instead of causing schism among us, that definite grouping and 
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method will turn out to be in the interest of ultimate agreement. 
We shall not only live more comfortably together when we learn 
to bid godspeed to one anoth·er in following out these con-
trasted schemes, but we shall be in the way of accelerated motion 
toward concentration of these tentative conceptions into a unity. 
I I. Speaking for the nwment ·as an adherent of the second 
tendency) in contrast with the first) I would say that1 so far as our 
type of sociologists has become self-conscious) we are agreed that 
nothing is social which is not psychical. 
Climate, topography, soil, have the same relation to human 
association that the temperature of a hall has to the rendering of 
a symphony. Temperature is not music; it does not cause 
music; it is not transmutable into music; it cannot express' the 
essence of music. It is a condition in varying degrees favorable 
or unfavorable to the production of music. The psychological 
sociologists are virtually agreed that physics, in the widest sense 
of the term, has no more intimate connection with sociology than 
thermodynamics has with thoroughbass and counterpoint. 
I2. Speaking still for the second) or sociological) type of 
method) I would further define our agreem-ent (llbout our particu-
lar problems by saying that they are all primarily inquiries into 
the reactions of associates upon each other. 
Indulging my own preference among psychological terms, I 
would resolve every sentient act into the three essential elements: 
attention, valuation, and volition. Given a hypothetical non-
socius, with foothold on the earth, but with no contacts with 
other individuals of his kind, sentient action on the part of such 
solitary individual is conceivable under stimulus of physical need. 
Attention, valuation, and volition might co-operate in a rudi-
mentary way in the process of adjusting conduct to the physical 
conditions, in utter absence of spiritual environment. Whether 
such hypothesis has any uses in phychology, it is obviously obiter 
dictum for sociology. In our division of labor the individual, 
whether real or hypothetical, is supposed to be taken for granted, 
and our special type of work is with individuals involved in the 
processes of action and reaction upon one another. 
In particular the primary s~iological question may be resolved 
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into these details: What are the variations, and the laws of vari-
ation, of the reactions exerted upon associates by their discordant 
and concerted attention, their discordant and concerted valua-
tions, and their discordant and concerted volitions? These are 
the stuff out of which all social phenomena are composed. We 
are agreed that social situations are permutations of the ways 
in which given collections of associates attend to the same things, 
or different things, value the same things or different things, 
and will the same things or different things. We are Cl!greed that 
social processes are variations of the ways in which the atten-
tion, valuation, and volition of members of groups are modified 
in direction and in kmd by the direction and kind of attention, 
valuation, and volition exercised by other members of the group. 
13. We are agreed that sociology itself is a sentient act) 
with each of the factors of sentiency raised to the nth power. 
Speaking literally, the scope of sociology includes divisions 
analogous with the cardinal phases of a sentient act in the con-
sciousness of an individual; i.e., sociological consciousness is in 
part knowing what is or has been in typical human associations; 
it is concurrently evaluating what is or has been with reference 
to what we know about the evolving interests of persons; it is 
all in all willing so as to realize the things ascertained to be 
worth while. 
We are consequently agreed in hoping that modern activity 
psychology may magnify its office by clarifying our perception 
that this tripartite composition is involved in complete science, 
just as it is involved in the simplest complete sentient act. As 
the individual act is either a resultant of knowing, feeling, and 
willing, or it is neither knowing, feeling, nor willing-that is, 
it is not a proper sentient act at all; so professed knowledge or 
norm or choice is an empty algebraic form of mental gesture 
unless it is validated by functioning at one and the same time as 
knowing and v.aluing and willing. 
This does not signify that in our formal organizations of 
sociology we must develop arbitrarily bounded divisions of socio-
logical knowledge (science?), sociological valuations (ethics?), 
and sociological technique (constructive programmes). Whether 
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this shall occur or not is a detail, and it will be settled by experi-
ence. This essential perception is that real knowledge of human 
association is complete only when it expresses itself as ClJ whole 
with these constituent phases. The closer the sociologists keep 
to reality, the more certainly will sociology develop as an activity 
of the three dimensions-cognitive, ethical, and constructive. 
I4. The attempt, under propositions I I , I2, and IJ, to speak 
solely for the psychological method illustrates the impossibility 
of keeping within the limits of reality if we assume a realm in 
which psychical influences are insulated from physical factors. 
At best, or worst, our efforts to claim everything for psy-
chics concede something to physics. To that extent they adver-
tise our gravitation toward agreement upon the third, which 
we may call the synthetic method. This proposition harks back 
to the view indicated in 4· 
I 5· We arre agreed that the structural or static phase of social 
occurrences is a sort of mirage. 
That is, our mental limitations force us to take refuge in 
provisional static representations of social occurrences, but the 
reality which we partially apprehend under these static forms is 
a tension of forces constantly rearranging the relations of the 
associates who compose the situation. The relatively permanent 
elements in association are not the structural phases but the 
dynamic factors. Analysis of societary forms is therefore a 
relatively superficial phase of sociology : analysis of societary 
forces is the ultimate process of pure sociology. 
I6. We are agreed that it is no longer profitable to discuss 
the question whether this, that, or the other is ((sociology." 
The profitable methodological question deals not with defi-
nition, nor with form, but with effect. Is a given inquiry of any 
use toward enlarging and informing our social consciousness? 
If it is, it is bound to find its place in the sociological encyclo-
paedia in proportion to the kind and degree of its service in 
correcting or co-ordinating our social knowing, and valuing, 
and willing. 
I 7. We are agreed that it is no longer profitable to attempt 
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to assign divisions of labor in sociology by a priori distribution 
of functions. 
Most of the work that we shall do for a long time to come is 
likely to be in effect qualitative rather than quantitative. We 
shall be getting problems into shape for our successors to work 
on. We shall be discovering how one sort of problem depends 
upon another. We shall be working out an algebra of the social 
forces, and meanwhile learning a little about relations of less 
and more in concrete social cause and ·effect. Meanwhile, we are 
likely to look with decreasing favor on apalogues of the trade-
union policy of forbidding a spare carpenter to help unload 
material, because that is the teamster's job, or a spare plumber 
to lend a hand in lifting a step-ladder, because that is the plaster-
er's job. If our inquiry, for example, starts with social technology, 
and takes us back and forth from social description and interpre-
tation to the application that we are trying to invent, there will 
be fewer sociological walking delegates to bar our way. On the 
other hand, we are entering on a period in which sane science is 
likely to be promoted best by men who will incidentally point the 
ways in which valid knowledge and feeling and willing about 
social relations are dependent upon one another. That is, to 
repeat the conclusion of 13, we are agreed that social science, of 
whatever name, is abortive as knowledge, unless it is making 
toward the common goal of apprehending the meaning of human 
experience for our threefold activity of cognition, valuation, and 
volition. 
18. We are agreed that, whatever our particular part in the 
process of accumulating social knowledge, our perception of the 
oneness of social knowledge, and of the futility of all p-seudo-
science which is untcWMe of this oneness, delegates to us a dis-
tinctive office among students of societary phenomena. 
Irrespective of our special divisions of labor, we are united 
in the purpose of showing that all divisions of labor in the social 
sciences are intelligent in the degree in which they are conscious 
of their subordination to the inclusive labor of discovering the 
whole meaning of human experience. We are essentially proph-
ets of scientific synthesis, however special may be the province 
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in which we are carrying on our particular sort of analysis, or 
however concrete may be our attempts to apply sociological 
knowledge to practice. 
19. We are agreed that our distinctive center of attention and 
our principle of synthesis is personality. 
This proposition marks the strategic point in our campaign 
for recognition of the sociological point of view. We have made 
far too little of the difference in this respect between the out-
look of the sociologists and that of men who approach societary 
relations from other points of departure. 
Our attempt is to promote knowledge of human experience 
in t~rms of the make-up of the persons who enact the experi-
ence. We are trying to interpret what was, and is, and is to be 
in human association, both as phases and functions of the sim-
ple forms of personality in the individual units and as phases and 
functions of the composite personality in associations. 
Whether we are aware of it or not, this is a radical differen-
tiating principle between the essentially sociological and the non-
sociological. The whole difference between atomism and co-
ordination depends on whether we assume evolving individual 
and associated persons as our center of interpretation, or take 
selected institutions or products of persons as the center. In 
the 'lormer case, every occurrence finds its meaning, whether as 
cause or as <.ffect, only as it is referred to its functional place in 
the p1 o-:ess of evolving types of individuals and of associations. 
In ~he lCltter case, each institution, domestic, ceremonial, political, 
ecclesiar:tical, professional, industrial (to adopt Spencer's 
familiar rub1 ics for convenience), is by the method of procedure 
prorroted in turn to the rank of center of attention. This rank 
is conferred not by the abject necessity of a serial order in the 
exerci~e of attention. It is conferred by mobilizing a principle 
of dissociation of ideas, instead of transferring attention from 
one class of objects to another while anchored to a common 
center of correlation. 
When, for example, we project a "science of wealth" or a 
"science of government," we take a step in the direction of scien-
tific anarehy. If followed up by as many steps in the same 
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direction qs have been the rule rather than the exception, the 
procedure becomes, not only in principle, but in effect, scientific 
anarchy. That is, it does not merely propose to isolate a function 
or a product of human activities from the whole scheme of 
activities for temporary examination as an incident of those 
actwtttes. It rather selects that particular function or product 
-say govemment, or wealth-and arbitrarily imputes to it, for 
"scientific" pm poses, the character and value of an end unto 
itself. The essential question of such a presumptive science 
thereupon becomes : "What is the meaning and value of any-
thing and everything, persons included, as determined by their 
relations to the status or development of this posited end, gov-
ernment, wealth, religion, morality, etc., etc. ?" 
Even if a "science" so abstracted is understood at the begin-
ning to be centered at last not in itself, but in a containing 
scheme of things, as the science of wealth evidently was in Adam 
Smith's mind for instance, it nevertheless accepts an almost 
impossible handicap at the outset. It starts off with the work-
ing assumption that the actual scheme of things may with impu-
nity be treat·ed as though it were what it is not-viz., a disjunction 
of an indefinite number of ·ends unto themselves. The longer 
that lead is followed, the more certainly will it tend to splinter 
knowledge into a litter of unintelligible fragments. 
This is pt·ecisely the condition in the social sciences which it 
is the central function of the sociologists to correct. The ques-
tion, "What is the meaning and value of anything and every-
thing for any abstractable phase or product of life whatsoever?" 
is never scientifically legitimate, except in so far as it is held 
inst:·n.i:ly subordinate and answerable to the one central question, 
"What is the meaning and value of anything and everything as 
determined by its relations to the evolution of persons?" Per-
sonality is the final normative principle within the range of our 
knowledge. Any science is falsely so called in the degree in 
which it feels licensed to suspend that norm of correlation, and 
to act as though there were alternative principles of interpreta-
tion. 
20. We are agreed tha.t, whatever degree of emphasis the 
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inadequacy of our knowledge requires us to put on the cognitive 
or the .evaluating phases of the sociological process} these phases 
must always rank in the last analysis as provisional and tribu-
tary} while we must regMd the volitional} constructive phase as 
ultimate. 
From one point of view the tasks of life may be divided into 
four groups : We have, first, to make the earth yield its increase 
in the largest abundance, or, more generally expressed, to get 
control of physical material and forces. We have, second, to 
remake and reapply these natural resources so that they will 
serve the largest number and widest range of human purposes. 
We have, third, to distribute the benefits of these natural and 
acquired resources in such a way that the permanent interests 
of society will be most equitably conserved. We have, fourth, to 
apply these distributed resources in such a way that they will do 
most toward realizi11tg the spiritual possibilities of human, beings 
and toward developing higher types of human association. As 
we have come to the conclusion that the dynamic phases of life 
are the final terms for our intelligence, it follows that we must 
regard all phases of ability or knowledge as relatively tentative 
until they have yielded their meaning for this fourth and final 
division of human interest. 
DISCUSSION 
PROFESSOR JAMES E. HAGERTY, OHIO . STATE UNIVERSITY 
The sociologists ought to be under obligation to Professor Small for what 
he has done in his General Sociology in analyzing the work of sociologists to 
find what is held in common by them. Whether we agree with him or not that 
there is a large body of truths held in common by sociologists, his method and 
work are the most hopeful promise that sociologists may soon come to a realiza-
tion of their agreements rather than their differences. 
Sociology cannot be said to have made much progress so long as the writers 
·of general treatises on the subject feel compelled to fill a fair portion of their 
works . with the discussion of such topics as definitions of sociology, method of 
sociology, scope of sociology, purpose of sociology, social laws and units of 
investigation, to say nothing of the fruitless attempt to solve the riddle : "Is 
sociology a science?" The appearance of these topics in the foreground ·is the 
surest evidence of the unsettled state of sociological investigation. Until writers 
on the subject can make certain assumptions as to point of view of sociologists 
and the general nature of social phenomena, and proceed without a preliminary 
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digression to an analysis and discussion of the data, sociology will not make 
much headway. On this account, treatises like the one referred to and dis-
cussions like the present are of parmou11 t importance. 
The principles laid down by Professor Small in the paper are so numerous 
that it will be impossible to discuss at length many of them. 
The differences between sociologists are frequently due to differences in 
centers of interest, as Professor Small intimates. The bias of the individual 
investigator, whether biological, psychological, or economic, is responsible for the 
chief differences in view and in method. As sociology is a new science, most of 
the contributors to it have come from some other department of learning. If the 
investigator is a biologist, he is somewhat inclined to apply to sociology the laws 
deduced "from p> ccesses that occur in anteceder.t orders in the scale of evolu-
tion." If the writer is a psychologist, he is apt to emphasize psychicd phenomena 
as the cause of group-relationships. If the investigator is an economist, he is 
quite likely to find in the physical environment, in "land," to use Professor 
Small's terminology, the chief causes of social organization and pror, ; ess. The 
scientific bias in approaching the subject. which it seems almost impossible 
to avoid, is chiefly responsible for the failure to agree on fundamentals. 
I agree fully with the writer of the paper in what he says of the need for 
properly appraising the physical and psychical cz.uses in social study. I cannot 
agree with him, however, in his contention thr.t the interests of science will be 
best served, and that "the two groups will live together more harmoniously," 
if those representing each of the contrasted views would work out their theories 
of social forces and causes to the exclusion of the views held by those in the 
opposing camp. This is what sociologists !J.ave been doing, and this is why there 
is lack of harmony between them. 
No matter what his preferences are, the sociologist should admit the e:!Ost-
ence of the two forces and attempt to assign to each its proper role as a social 
cause. Professor Small himself, then speaking avowedly as an adherent t f the 
psychical causes, says that "climate, topograp'ly, soil, have the same relation to 
human association that the temperature of a hall has to the rendering of a 
symphony." It seems to me that this conclusion is one of the best evidences of 
the short-comings of a method which follows out one class of causes exclusively 
to its own logical consequences ; and, moTeover, this point of view does not 
contribute ve ty much to the harmony of the two groups, which is assumed to be 
desirable. Climate, topography, and soil have very much to do, fundamentally, 
with human association. If we will take an extreme ';ituation, such as the life 
of the Kentucky mountaineer, it must be admitt::d, I think, that the three forces 
named ate very largely the determining facto.s in the association, life, and 
character of these people. This is said witho;:t wishing to be open to the 
charge of assigning too much importance to the physical as against the psychical 
causes in human association. Admitting the role. of \.he two classes of causes in 
determinivg social phenomena, the attempt to interp1et those phenomena by 
one class of causes will lead to conclusions which are unsound. 
"Analysis of societary forms is, therefore, a relatively superficial phase of 
sociology. Analysis of societary forces is the ultimate process of pure soci-
ology." The acceptance of these conclusions, stated in the paper, means much 
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for the advancement of sociology. A description of social structure is valu-
able, but it is not the ultimate thing in sociology. But what is to be our method? 
How are we going to appreciate societary forces rnd get at the ultimate causes? 
I agree with the writer of the paper "that our distinctive center of atten-
tion is personality ;" that "our attempt is to promote knowledge of human 
experience in terms of the make-up of the persons who enact the experience." 
We have been interpreting and reasoning too much in sociology at long range. 
We have been applying principles and laws deduced from other fields to human 
association without verifying them. We have neglected to study the associating 
·person, to learn about his impulses, his wants, and the forces that control him. 
·If sociology is to be put on a plane with other sciences, we must find its phe-
nomena in human association, and we must study these phe·nomena at first hand. 
The studeJ:)t of sociology should have training in biology, psychology, economic 
geography, and history, in order that his view-point may be broadened for social 
interpretation. In the university with which I am connected our students are urged 
to take courses in biology, psychology, economic geography, and history, and we 
recommend especially that they do work in settlements, and, if possible, reside 
in a settlement. Work in a settlement, or in any capacity which brings the 
student intimately in contact with the life of people outside of his own group, 
is the most valuable training for the sociologist. It must be admitted that most 
of us who are now teaching sociology have been inadequately trained for our 
work. Hope for agreement lies with the sociologists of the future. When our 
students appear who have the capacity to know and understand people, who are 
trained to be sociologists, we shall have some promise of agreement among 
sociologists. 
Professor Ross has said somewhere that what sociology needs is body and 
content, and that we should go to history and ethnology for material. I am in 
full agreement with him on this point, but unfortunately, history has not been 
written in such a way as to be of much value to the sociologist. The neglected 
factors of history are needed most by the sociologist. For some time the 
sociologist will need to do a great deal of descriptive work. We should have a 
social history of the various commonwealths written by men trained in sociol~gy. 
Until work of this kind is done, and until more detailed work is done in 
studying social groups of various kinds, the sociologist is not likely to make 
much headway. When this work is done, sociologists will have much less reason 
to quarrel with each other because of a lack of real subject-matter ; they will 
be in a better position then to explain the laws of human association and to 
interpret social progress. 
PROFESSOR J. Q. DEALEY, BROWN UNIVERSITY 
The excellent paper of Dr. Small's, with its statement of numerous points 
of probable agreement among sociologists, shows one resemblance at least between 
sociology and theology. Writers in either branch, when they emphasize their 
differences, seem very far apart, but are in close harmony when agreements 
are emphasized. This is especially true when by "agreement" is meant "inclina-
tion to emphasize." Probably most who have followed the development of 
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sociological thought in recent years would go almost to the full length with Dr. 
Small in his statement of agreements. 
We have pt\sscd through the biologic:•! stege and now have grave doubts in 
regard to organic analogies. We are <' ll members of the psychological school of 
sociology, but place greater or. less emphasis on physical or economic factors as 
conditioning the development at".d activity of mental factors. There is perhaps 
a proper distinction bC;tv. een th(; static and the dynamic in sociology worth 
·emphasizing; yet, after all, the dynamic processes and societary forces are 
increasingly attracting attention. Dr. Small rightly emphasized the unity of all 
social knowledge. The special social sciences are too often treated as discrete 
studies, and their unity is neglected. I for one am in hearty sympathy with the 
speaker in his assertion that ultimately the volitional constructive phase of 
sociology will prove worthy of the fundamentr I emphasis. The constructive 
aspect of sociology is appealing to human minds like a new gospel. After all, 
whether we dream, with the utopians, of a coming perfection, or, with Spencer, 
grind it out slowly at the mills of the gods, we look forward to the time when 
human personality, developed throug_h wisdom, forethought, and volitional energy, 
may expedite the natural processes of evolution, and bring about a social organi-
zation dominated by ideas of justice and fraternity. 
Brown University has now had a sociological department for sixteen years. 
About three thousand different students have taken one or more courses during 
that time. At first we taught concrete studies, such as charity and crime, and 
then took up principles and theory. For the past ten years we have reversed this 
process, and are well satisfied with the results. Every year we put about 175 
sophomores through a course in the principles of sociology ; after that they may 
elect concrete studies. We do not desire to turn out "social reformers" so 
much, as men familiar with the broader principles of social development. Fix 
the principle in the mind, and the application of it will follow. 
PROFESSOR E. C. HAYES, MIAMI UNIVERSITY 
Of all the features in Professor Small's paper which are provocative of 
thought I select for discussion that which he mentions, not as a "point of concur-
rence," but of divergence, among sociologists; for it presents a problem. I 
refer to the question he raises concerning the place in sociology of physical and 
psychic phenomena respectively. 
It seems probable that a large part of the divergence and uncertainty con-
cerning the scope of sociology has been due to a reluctance to treat the problems 
of human life and activity by strictly scientific methods. The splendid promise 
of sociology rests largely on the fact that we are at last getting ready to apply 
to the problems of human life methods of, investigation like those which have 
long proved their fruitfulness in the explanation of physical phenomena. The 
a priori, philo5ophic method, by which it has been customary to treat the prob-
lems of man's life and conduct, consisted in pondering hard questions until 
there were evolved in the thinker's mind answers that harmonized with each 
other, with such information as he chanced to have, with his disposition and 
prejudices, and with the practical interests which he regarded. The scientific 
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method consists, not in closing the eyes to ponder, but in opening the eyes to 
look I, And the first essential question in coming to agreement as to the scope 
of a science is: What is it out there at which we should all be looking? 
When sociologists attempt to answer this question, their formulas differ 
exceedingly. But it may not be too much to say that, when they have made 
valued and accepted contributions to sociologicrl know~edge, it is because they 
have been studying prevalent modes of activity tb~t go on among men. These 
activities, I think, are the phenomena at which sociologists must look. Human 
activities ·include all the believing and desiling, the suffering and enjoying, the 
struggle ar..d striving, which together make up the content of the life of men and 
of civilizations-a psychic world with its problems of the evolution and of the 
continuous conditioning of its phenomena . The descriptions of sociology must 
become ':!ndytic ; not like a tr~ve\er's description of h ndscapes, but like a 
scientids rc ;ort of a collecting 'expedition, where each flower-clad hii!Jide has 
been seen as an assemblage of identifyuble varieties of plants, and each plant 
as one of a species. The complex activities of peoples and epochs are composed 
of numerous sin, ple modes of activity, repertcd by many individuals ; no activity 
of one individuvl is exf'ctly repeated by another, but the differences between 
individual activities of the same mode mry be compared with the differences 
between individual plants of the same Jpecies. The life of a person con-
sidered as a whole is complex and unique, but the simple modes of activity are 
repeated in the lives of thoasands within the group, and usually also of other 
thousand~ in other groups. The pn:valent modes of activity weave and inter-
weave, a.nd tozether constitute the vast streaming of the social pro'Cess. 
Professo r. Small suggested a necessary step toward the agreement sought 
when he said that sociology has nothing to do with any metaphysical concepts 
that may be thought to underlie social phenomena. Sociology has to do only 
with phenomena and with relations among phenomena. Activities are pnychic 
phenomena, and as truly phenomena as material things. The difference between 
physical and psychic phenomena that is of significance for sociology lies mainly 
in the way we know them-my own activity arises in my own consciousnens, but I 
cannot be conscious of a hitching-post, I can only become aware of it, through 
intervention cf the senses. Every activity included in the social process goes 
on in the corscio'lcness of some irdividu?1• But the fragment of the whole pro-
cess which goes on in the consciousness o i any m~e individual is infinitesimal, so 
that the soci':!l p i·ocess as a whole is as objective to any single observer, as 
mountdnr, rivei3, seas, and prairies are; and becomes accessible to observation 
only as it is disclosed by tht: bodies and material works of men, which may be 
called the ,<c,cio-physical phenomena. If all this be true, then the task of nociology 
is to identify, describe, and explain the prevalent modes of human activity, as 
they are disclosed by the socio-physical phenomena. 
In order to secure agreement as to the scope of a science, it is first necessary 
to agree as to what phenomena the science is to describe and explain, but it is 
no less necessary to agree as to what is meant by explanation. 
I share in the high hopes that have been expressed concerning the pro-
spective usefulness of sociology, but it seems to me that the service of a science 
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must consist in the intellectual comprehension which it affords. It is only by 
explaining how things are caused that we acquire ability to cause anything 
desirable ; by such enlightenment we are enabled to discern the courses of action 
that lead to good and those that lead to evil, and are supplied with motives to 
pursue the one and shun the other. 
I wish to protest against the idea that we can explain social phenomena by 
referring them to · various "social forces." The habit, almost universal among 
sociologists, of referring frequently to "social forces" I believe is a bad one 
that ought to be broken. The phrase is often equivalent to "motives ;" but 
referring activity to a motive does not constitute a sociological explanation; 
whether by that word is meant an idea, a desire, or a compound of both, a prev-
alent motive is itself a social phenomenon to be explained. . When it does not 
mean motive, the phrase "social force" may refer to a class of social activities 
or a form of conditioning relations, as in the expressions "force of custom" and 
"force of imitation ;" or to congenital properties of human nature. The temp-
tation to use it lies in its metaphysical quality of drugging the mind's hunger 
for explanation with a false satisfaction by yielding the complaisance 
of understanding without the labor of obstinate analysis. Sociology, I believe, 
has nothing to do with any "social force" any more than biology has to do with 
a "vital force." 
Explanation of the phenomenon x (in the case of sociology a prevalent 
mode of activity) consists in showing the phenomenon x in its relations to the 
conditioning phenomena a, b, c, etc., in the presence of which x emerges, by the 
increase of which x increases, and by the diminution of which x diminishes. 
Of course, this expression is schematic, as for brevity it must be here; there 
are counteracting as wei! as promoting conditions, and other changes in phe-
nomena than changes in mere prevalence; and types of change in human 
activities are susceptible of similar explanation, and their explanation is implied 
in the explanation of prevalent modes of activity. It is only prevalent (or 
recurrent) phenomena the explanation of which can be stated in the form oi 
a law; and a scientific law is-is it not ?-a statement of the regular relation 
between recurrent phenomena and the. conditions in the presence of uhich lhcy 
emerge. Sociological explanation can relate prevalent modes of activity to the 
cocditions by virtue of which they become prevalent at one place and time and 
not at another, with the increase of which, in passing to another place or time, 
they increase in prevalence, and with the diminution of which they diminish in 
prevalence. 
In order to agree as to the scope of a science, it is necessary tc> specify 
what the science is to describe and explain, and what is meant by explanation ; 
and also-if there is to be a science at all-it is necessary to agree that the 
phenomena to be studied are capable of explanation-that is, tha t they a1e caused. 
The prevalence at any given time or pl::ce of any given activity-gocd, b~ d. or 
indifferent-is <!S truly caused as any other natura! phenomenon ; that i~, it is 
conditioned by other related phenomena. We may never be able to ptedict 
which individual will become a dr unkard, but we can tell that with variation in 
certain conditions of climate, diet, domicile, employment, social approvals and 
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beliefs, the prevalence of drunkenness will vary. We may not be able to pre-
dict which individuals will act in a certain way, any more than tb'e actuary can 
predict which man out oi a thousand will die within five years, though he does 
know that the average death-rate for five years will fall within certain limits ; 
or any more than the student of physiology and hygiene can predict which 
individual in a neighborhood will die of typhoid fever, although he does know that 
the prevalence of typhoid fever in that neighborhood is due to certain con-
ditions, and that the ~,bateme11t of such conditions would diminish its prevdence 
or stDmp it out entirely. The importance, both practical and scientific, of 
similar knowledge with reference to social phenomena is not to be disparaged. 
In accounting for the prevalence of different modes of social activity, 
physic:'! ~nd psychic conditions are alike to be considered. Indeed, one who 
seeks for the explanation of soci2.l phenomena must be on the watch for con-
ditioning phenomena of iour classes : first, climate, natural resources, etc.-in a 
word, geographic conditions; second, domiciles, railroads, ~ther accumulations of 
capital, in general, the material products of man's work-in one word, technic 
conditions ; third, physical health and strength, temperaments and capacities, 
whatevet c~n be passed on by biological heredity, including predispositions of 
nerve and btain fo r thought ~nd action, sometimes referred to as the "social 
force," but all of which together may better, be named biologic conditions, 
hereditury ar>.d acquired; fourth, the other activities if! the preser>.ce of which 
the activity to be explained goes on-that is, the psychic conditions. 
Would not an adequate basis for a working agreement among sociologists 
be afforded by concurrence as to these three points? First, the phenomena 
studied by sociology are explicable; that is, a sociological phenomenon-as 
re~Jly 2,s any-is conditioned by other phenomena; second, to enable us to see 
the sociological phenomena in their relations to the conditioning phenomena is 
to afford the explanation sought; and third, the phenomena to be identified, 
desci;bcd, and Lxplained are the pt,evPlent modes of human activity, which make 
up the social process. As to the place in sociology of physical and psychic 
phenomena-the prevalent modes of activity included in the social process, all 
go on in the consciousness of man, that is, they are psychic phenomena ; but 
they become accessible to observation as disclosed by the bodies and material 
works of men, which are the socio-physical phenomena; and in the explanation 
of the psychic phenomena thus disclosed it is necessary to regard alike con-
ditioning phenomena which are physical and others which are puychic--'namely 
the geographic, technic, physiologic, and psychic conditions. 
